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Introduction 
As you are all hynow aware. Work in~ Group Ill. \\hich dcals with 
k•~aL institutional and rdat,'d matter~. will play a central role in 
rhe prcparaiions ror 1he ! ')92 l initcd Nations l\n1fcrenc:e tm 
Fnviromnent and Devdopmcnt I l iNCEDI. 
T,l datL·. the Work in~ Cr,,up has rt,n1scd its dfons primarily 
in 1 hree areas: 
• an ,·valuation of the dkcti\·,•nes, Pi c,islin~ :1~rccments 
;md i nslrtlllll'llh: 
• lhl' elaboration .. r k~al prnll'ip!L-s Ill he rnduckd in th,· 
"Earth Clla1w1°· ,,·xpc·ctnl to result from !hc (\,nfcr1.'IKL': and 
• arcv1cwn1thc rolc and funuionin~nl till' L'.; ,y,tt·m in the' 
•.:nnn,nmcrn area. 
T,,tby I would likc tn :rddre,, thrce i~slles that havL· n:n:i\c'd 
little attcnti,)n in the envi1:t1nm~•nt;1l fi,•ld ;ind c(1n,equently ~l'l'lll 
tn have· Lil kn inlti !:',.IP" in llfr, ,tc!l'litb. l!< 1\\l'\l'f. tlk'Y dead)' 
l·oncern both k::cal and instimtinnal is-,uc<;. ,1mL .1, -1 hope to point 
,1ur. may Ix of con~idcrahlc urility in atlv:mcing thc a!!t:nda oft he 
, ~~"19{1!!~~!{ !~1;~f~1!iii~~~t~yj,, ~ii~liiiii~:~~~~.~%\~~;;;· 
·;;:;; ... ;:,. .·. · ·,.· .·.,, •,;, · .· · .. · ··. .· • · · .· · at·mosr·mtetnall'onill·conferences·are:taken.by· ~consehstis"-
t:t~)~{:~-!.-: 
·D01hestic envimnment,il·li1wyer~.cU:n be excused for shock Ji )•···.·•niuliilateiil·processes dmcreate u huilt:.:inJ6~rtf~:.which.·well :->· 
5)}A:;-~ -~~!;~~~~;0;:::!~:;)~~;~i~~~~f~:~;:~~'1f,~;l;~·::~:~~~!.!;~,,~1n:z~::;::~)F ''~!f''fi~~~~£~~;~~J~~~~·r~~::1:~;1~1~~,jg~~~:::~:~~~-•:r•'"'."'''••C .. 
and members of American society, we are accustomed to a obligatiq~s ~fan agreement may not enter into force for some 
variety of procedural rights in the fornmlation of our domestic time for lack of a critical mass of countries to accept them, an 
environmentallaws: notice of proposed regulations, the oppoitu- effect sbii1etiines known as the "slowestboat" phenomenon. 
1:)ity to comment on those proposals1 the necessity for agency 
response to our comments. and, perhaps most imp011antly. the 
capacity to enforce all those rights against government rule-
The Law-Making Function and the Public 
making agencies through suits for judicial review. Once regula- International legal standards in the environmental field are often 
tions are in place. additional remedies in the form of the citizen much less well developed than in other areas of international law. 
enforcement actions created by most of the major environmental Indeed, the international community is now very much absorbed 
statutes allow members of the public to sue polluters not in with the process of creating environmental norms. For instance, 
compliance with environmental standards. the law of navigation has been well established for the better part 
Moreover, in our domestic legal scheme. we are accustomed of a century and was codified more than 25 years ago. By 
to the adoption of environmental policies through representative contrast, the first international agreements on such pressing 
processes that we might generically describe as "legislative';\ .· environmental problems ai(expori:s ofh;u:ardous wastes. and 
that is~ procedures that requir~ sqll,le rritical mass of agreefl11!nt depletion of the strato~pheric ozorte)ayer h~ve been concluded . 
on the part of poi icy-maker~; bui not unanfrnity; Our e~viron\ . . . o~ly in the last five.years:J,iegottatio~s on the creation ofJbe first 
meijial legislation is adopte~ by majority v.ote in both houses,of" · ··. and only internat1onal:Jegal norm~:designed to protect th~ integ:-
the 'congress. Urianimity ~nidhg our el~~ted. represenilitiy,~ils. .• : rity' of tiie'Eartti;'i¢H'maI~>'an{6oly now·begirining~ _For this 
not essential; nor is it necessariiy even desirable. •' - reason, .jf no othe~;Jhe procti~~~lhy which such inteinatiorfal 
On the international level, the situation is very different. rules are created demand close scrutiny. 
Indeed. an international lawyer listening to this presentation Resolution of many international environmental issues in an 
might be excused for shock at the notion that there should be any international context has. significant benefits. A multilateral law-
role for the public in international environmental law. For a very making process is a unique opportunity to craft world-wide, 
long time. international law was defined strictly-as the set of legal highly inclusive legal regimes that further critical environmental 
norms governing the relations among countries or nation-states, goals while simultaneously balancing the needs and expectations 
ordinarily as represented by their governments. Consequently, of all countries. Indeed, considerable multilateral law-making 
private entities had no procedural rights whatsoever. whether in activity is taking place on regulatory issues in specialized fora 
informal bilateral discussions between two governments or in such as the United Nations Environment Programme. These 
more fom1al multilateral processes at intergovernmental organi- negotiations have a very different, and often more constructive, 
zations like the United Nations. Some areas of international law, character than the acrimony associated with United Nations de-
most notably the field of human rights, now acknowledge a role 
for the individual•. Still. there is no known international human 
rightto a healthyenvi(orlment,and these development& generally 
have not penetrated to the environmental field.. 
Moreover, an international lawyer welhnight be appalled at 
the notion of non-consensus decisionmaking procedures .. The 
international legal system assumes internctions a111ong co-equal, 
sovereign nation-states. Legally binding obligations in the inter-
national legal system arise principally through consent. That 
consent can be expressly given. as in the case of adherence to a 
multilateral agreement, or implied, as in the development of 
customary legal obligations. For reasons of speed and precision 
in the creation and identification of obligations. in the environ-
15 
bates on issues of high political drama like the Middle East. Less 
well appreciated are the significant drawbacks that accompany 
the transfer ofthese issu~Jrom domestic to international fora. 
Depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, which protects life 
on the entire earth from harmful levels of ultraviolet radiation, is . . . 
a compelling example. Th_e Clean Air Act directs the U.S. 
Environmenial Ptotedioh Ag¢ncy (EPA)to respond by regula-
tion ifthereis reason to ~iieve that health and environment are 
endangered by human activities that deplete stratospheric ozone. 
Acting pursuantto this mandate, EPA in 1978 prohibited nones-
sential uses - such as spray aerosol propellants - of ozone-
destr~ying chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). This rule-making was 
accompanied by the ordinary procedural guarantees of notice by 
,;'
0 ,,.~[§~~t~~1~g~[:~:z~~~~t'::, :~I~I~B!~~JZf E~~iil~I lE~~·· 
. ' s111ai1 '11un1ber ofus~sof CF'.Cswas insllffi~ient to uddress,major .. ,.,,, stillerratic,,;ofor,example,industry>',tnd,,trade,~~i9Iishavefastitu-'. 
threatslo the integrity.of the stratospheric;ozone foyer, which by·· tionalized rolesifrthe Organizatiqry forJEcolibJ11ibi)(S6crp~--~tipn' · 
then.was seriously disrupted by a continlc!nt..:sized "hole" over. and Development(OECD). but ther!!fSSO far,11oopporturii,ty for 
Antarctica. This time theissuewastreated inthefirst instance.in repres~tjtatives of pµj)licii'ltepist ~I\virnnrnentalorg~ti/zati.onsto'. 
a 1n1:1Itilateral fonun: UNEP> The resultini M.6ritreal Pi:orocol OIJ partidpate in theit'tl\V0 ri ,;ht . , . . . , ,, ·• .. /t•> ,., ., .. . . 
:::.~I~ !!~~::~1: ~t;::::;~}'o:::~~e~1i~~~e .. ·•.··•···"·'•: ..·:t.•h~.-....•  el·t .. e .•. W.·.·.··.s.•~1 ..  cn) ·_n_h•th.•···•.···e•··::1···· .. .••· m~••m·,_·•e .... .•.: i•·.: • . an·:·,··ht·.~.:.•.•··1···: ..•  o .• \,._:np,·.·.•·•·.·.·.·1a~·.r.···•.·.~-,:·•·~··•:·.•.·.•·•.·._.l~.te;e.• .  b •.·b.·gd··• ... c.·. .'a,··" .•. n .•. l. r.a·••: __ : .•. s.,·.s.·.:Y·.i.<.•.·.: .• s, . •··:.rt .. t-.qes:• .~P1~.·.·.· .•  r •. ~.v,r.· . .•. e.: ..  pa··i:s•.o_ •  ·..  •. '.~ ... wt .... •. •:es.·.t.·.·.••.·psl····P .•• l:.• .• a•·".s.r·•·.s·~-:•,·o•.·.:t.1 . co!.·.•_•,.s:•.~ .. tt . .•h:h.•'.n•e•·······d•··•··· ...• .epd .. ,w.:_ .  o·.•: . '.m·.·.;.·i·"•r·•··•h.·.•e:.rsa.yt·• .. :.• i· ..•.•c:.;_, ... '..-.·.·.·-.••i··•i-•l:.fe·.:_.g••.e.·.t . . ·.:a:_;l;··,•.•-•.-.-.·•· _gr1,,JinBl~m,~.me;,9, ,tM:c-Pmt9c:~r{~r91&h)i.,-:9ofo1;$ti£.,JµJ~r • . .. . _ ~-
making; much as)thaqthe l 978·spray prppell.am ban.' B ut,~his 
new rule-making V:,as significantly differentfro~ the earlier one. syste~s ofa v~riety of countries. in t'act. o~the interliationai level 
This time, virtually all major issues had already been decided in there isat leastone precedent that gives members of the public ncit 
the multilateral forum, where there was neither formal notice to just an opportunity to comment on, but an affinnative vote in, the 
the public nor formal opportunity to comment on the proceed- law-making process. In the international· Labor Organization 
ings. By the time of the domestic rule-making, those rights were (ILO). founded just after World Warl. members of the public -
essentially meaningless, as all the significant legal requirements in that case workers' and employers' organizations-are partici-
had been established in the Protocol. There also would be strong pating delegates to the annual International LaborConference. 
incentives for a reviewing court to decline to overturn the !'Jew The ILO's '."tripartite'' structure ensures that nongovernmental 
regulation, which is necessary for compliance by the United representatives at the Conference -Which is the ILO's plenary 
States as a matter of international law with the obligations in the body that adopts.binding multilateral conventions- are equal to 
Protocol. Further, an exemption in the Administrative Proce- governmental delegates in total numbers. 
dures Act, the bedrock of American public law, arguably strips In any event. the complexities of the task should not distract 
fundamental guarantees of access and accountability from this from the need for greater accountability as more and more issues 
and many CJther multilateral negotiations, with serious conse- thataffectpeople'slives._livelihoods. andtheveryhabitabilityof 
quences for the envirompentandpublic h¢alth inthiscountry. the planet are taken up in an international context.· . 
Serious problems lik\!lhis resulting from1he domestic irnpJec.: 
mentation cif intemationai legal requirementsare becoming more· 
pervasive, Besides, the stratospheric ozoqe, issuei international- . 
trade _in hazardous pesticides, chemicals, and inc\ustri,\l W,t,ste 
have all shifted from dornesti~ agency rule-making~ to multilat~ 
eral processes. Results from the current round of negotiations on 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT) may in fact 
open some environmental and public health regulations - such 
as those limiting pesticide residues in food - to international 
attack as non-tariff barriers to trade. Unlike a domestic rule-
making, the GA TT negotiations are highly secret and inacces-
sible to the public. As in the ozone example, there is likely to be 
no judicial review should the Executive Branch take an action 
contrary to law. 
The pesticide residue issue is, moreover. considerably more 
insidious than the ozone example. The Montreal Protocol cst.Ih-
lished a regulatory floor. leaving individual countries free to 
enact stricter measures. By contrast, the GATT neggtiations 
could set a de fattoregulatory ceiling, :uld strictcr;Jo,mestic 
measures designed to protect health and the environment could 
be a violation of international law. This same concern lies behind 
many.environmental objections to the United States-Mexico Free. 
Trade Agreement, which some fear might undermine don1estic' 
environment and public healih legislation and regulations iii the 
interest of hannonizing national and international standards. 
TI1e time has cotne to consider the creation of mechanisms to 
ensure the accountability of international legal processes such as 
the GA TT and Mexico free trade negotiations directly to the 
public. Often on an ad hoc basis. some scientists, business 
16 
The Enf~rcement Functi~~ and the Public 
Unless they are enforced. legal rules~ don~e~tic as. well-as 
international -are only so many bhick marks on apiece of paper. 
Unfortunate experience. as during the Reagan era. has high-
lighted the serious lapses that can result from reliance on public 
authorities as the sole entities for enforcing the environmental 
laws. As a result. many of the federal environmental statutes 
empower members of the public to sue polluters directly for 
violations of those laws. In addition to creating a remedy for 
individual grievances. this "private attorney general" model of 
citizen enforcement furthers the public interest by encouraging 
strict compliance with applicable standards. 
On the international level. there is a!s() great, and perhaps 
increasing. concern for full compliance and adequate enforce-
ment mechanisms. States undertaking major environmental 
obligations want to know that their partners in multilateral 
agre~ments arc in fact implemei1ting the same require~1ents. 
1 lowever. efforts hy one nation-state to compd perfommnce by 
another are often stymied by a variety of factors. Nation-states 
may be reluctant to initiate .stH·alled .. dispute resolution" proce-
dures· ltgainst other nation-states for 4.muhipliciiy of political 
reasons that may have nothing to do with. the actual controversy. 
For example. until the recent agreement nn air quality between 
the United States and Canada. there was nothing to prevent 
Canada from urging an international arbitration of the acid rain 
issue. Nonetheless. it probably goes without saying that such a 
proposal by the Government of Canada would he inextricably 
N,ff,A\\,•·.·••; ,states·on·the,international,levelc··· ... ,,,., .• ,,,,,.,. ..• .·• ,tional•environmenlaluonnsc'••qlhei:eare.,11"11~tllp~f!Pf.,prece.<1ents····· 
... ·. There isliothing a,uilogouslo a oi riien enforcem~nt actfon -Oil for access by private parlt~s tomt1Itilatetally~e,;,ta1?Jis~edfoecha~· 
the-internationallt'~·el· i11tl1cenviro1m1,e.ntfield. ·.Nonetheless. an nisms·.to adjudicate violations pf ireaty obligatiQrs,6y,nation~ 
'-· -. . .-· aµh6~ pr~1tbtype that lli~et6reffr,(q,as ;'p:n~ne.r,ship11dvocacy'' state~ llndf ailuresto observe.)ntell)a.1 op~rntingcrrocedlitesbytl1~ 
.. -........ ·. tuis;recenJlygrnwn .. upintlJ¢ po~te\t'():t".tlie OJ~going dcbate.Qvcr sta.ft\~f fritiltil.iteral organizations.• .. ·•.lnierrii\ti&ria.Lhu~arhrighis'·· 
t:;-nkn;i~:r.~ri~•~t~,'umtR~~afct~}:·:f:~t~J;ti{~:~:~r·--Wi.iSit'iHr~~·· ...• i•· .... , •. ,.·_ .•.... ,•. ·,•_·,_••·bR __ 1 ,· ·:····~ ..•... 1w.·.--.r_t·_o.·;.,-·-··h•.·• .. -.·.'.· •·.r .c,·.•1.·.:·•,e .. ' •..• s.•r-._·.-.·_-.• .  ·.e:,,,-,·:_:_.·•t.a:'o··l• .... ·• ·.tl_·• . -d· c·p····•·.>•.···.·._·~--•-·-_•·,•.·u•.··> .•. · • •. ·,·:s_;·r'·.•n_ ••• _.e_-. s···.·,,.l:.·_.mu,-J .•.. ,··.,~.··· .. ·,.e ·d·~_;·1·d·-·.·•.· • .. -,..l -1-.··.e .• s.··'·"·.·~ .. ·t,· •.. ·.h __.J,.i.·.~ ..  1'"·e·~·o·l.· .. ·.ul.r .. , ..  -.·.·.·.,".ipH . .•• · -_.1,·n_ •. · •_.t· :.;·.:·e·-·l,vl·,···.-d·,~:.,_',' ... l.·.Na.· •. t •.... ·•_.'_c· •. ·,:.n,·.· .  .• a.•• .· ..:·.,_.R •. i.·,.,··.•l:·•···_• .•o.a.:.i.··l .  i.·,· ... ·.•.•;_•.· .• t,·.··;·k._-·.s_•.i•'.··,···•-:_•_:et,i_ •. •. c.,s.·.·.• .. ' s: ... •.• .., ••·.·_··.~:·;·.a···, ..• '· .. , • _m;.-.:o,•.·~_.g._·,••.··,.·m.·.· . ~ •·· .•-·····--'i .. •. ' ..m~.I.···:.s··,;_·s·-·•··,·•···sl.·•---t·;~.l.· .. · ·t.·· .. •o.ne.·•.· . •.. n··.e.a ..  -·.·.•-': ..•.  ,· .. ··.1ci-•-.. n .. o,.•. ·_··.•.·:_H_· __ -.·_•-·-.-n.·.• .·.•_::.1·.-, ••• , . . m•., .. : .. a .. ·•. l .  •.·t· .. ·1:.:.·s.'n.~ .. ··•.·:·_•,; __ ·.•.·-.· .. •. •,.··.' .-•.'ii·.·.-·.·-•.··•-···,·._ . .
::1y.~1rl~LPnxir9wJ:icnH1L,a(i.}'.PS¾IFMi~"gWJ{f4;in1i~.J>.211,0fm~d ~hPUL ~, ... ,., ,. t., .. "' " .. -~ .• ~,Iii M • ,, ••• 
· the<activities•fi11anccd· a}"th~sc'jntero,it)onal org:inizations in.•.• · · ~16nf6f Jnquiry and-other :idjµgJF~tqr}': ofg·:u1s of;theJLO; and:• 
thcirowncountrieshavccrcatcdpartncrshipswitl-isimilarAmcri- regional courts and commissions, somc of Which have been 
can organizations. usually those located in Washington. The highly successful in responding to complaints by individuals of 
private. L!i1itcd States organization, acting on behalf of the Third human rights violations. There are likewise precedents for 
World partner as well as itself. then leverages policy change adjudicatory complaint mechanisms available .to individuals to 
indirectly at the international institution through the United remedy infringements of the internal procedures of international 
States Government.which in the case of the World Bank at least organizations. Most international organizations, including the 
is the largest shareholder among member governments. Para- World Bank, have an administrative tribunal for adjudicating 
doxically. and often sadly. the indirect route by which Washing- disputes, primarily employee grievances, b~tween officials of 
ton-based organizations act as interlocutor with the United States the organization and the organization itself. Thejurisdi~tion of 
Government and the World Bank is nften a more effcct ive mecha- this tribunal could be extended to encompass causes ofaction that 
nism for achieving the goals of Third World environmental could be initiated by members of the public. This modification 
activists than dialogue with their own governments_ However, as would uniformly guarantee effective remedies to those harmed 
the partnership strategy acquires greater resiliency with increas- by activities undertaken by this public institution in dispensing 
ing use. jt has h~gun to provide an emry point into international public monies, 
decjsicm~maki11g processes, by inst}tutions that· ar~-_notoriously 
stingy wi1h;i11fonnationand ·otherwise virtually imp~netralJleto•--•·· .· Non-Co~sensus D€cisfon-Making Procedures die public.··· · · · · · ·· ·. ·. · 
\.,Notwithstanding its supst,mtial success. the part.nership !idVo- . 
cac:yrnodCI still pr6vidCs strictly adljocremedie;sLFtom th~ point 
of view of Third World environment;lists. thenecessity to spe~k 
through the mouth of a foreign organization to resolve important 
questions of environmental and public health policy in their own 
countries may be unsatisfying in practice and unsatisfactory as a 
matter of principle. These makeshift arrangements are not a 
substitute for direct access t() meaningful remedies by those with 
a direct stake in the problem. 
Loan agreements between the World Bank and a member 
country government are analogous to treaties and contain en-
forceable obligations. The Bank also has internal operating 
procedures and requirements that retlect evolving international 
standards in the areas in which the Bank operates. At present the 
only .remedies for deviations by Bank professional staffers from 
their own operating procedures are wholly discretionary and . 
totaJly wlihin th~ hands of the World Bank's staff; wl-i,6 are ofte~. 
the :very same individuals that negofiareand implen1'6nt the loan 
agreement with the l,l<;>rrowing country. · 
... (A neutral adjuditatory• mechanism Would fill this gaping 
inaµequacy in the ef~stirig iruemationaJstructure. In .addition to 
creating a r~medy for individuai grievances. the adoption of a 
•·private attorney general'' model of citizen enforcement would, 
as in the domestic situation. further the public interest by encour-
aging compliance with applicable standards. Moreover, the 
creation of an adjudicatory mechanism to resolve grievances. 
arising from the dcvelopment assistance process would further 
One- way.to 9verco~1ethe ''least ~omrrion denominator" effect 
oftert observed inmultiiateral negotiations on erivironme11tai and 
other issues is throughfitnited d;vi~tions from strict applicatiori 
of the principles of consensus and consent. As currently struc-
tured, the international legal system puts into the hands of every 
nation-state what amounts in extreme cases to a veto power over 
an entire international undertaking. For this reason, there re-
cently have been calls for non-consensus decisionmaking proce-
dures, particularly in the environmental field. The Declaration of 
the Hague, adopted in March 1989 by no fewer than seventeen 
heads of state, asserts the need for a new international body that 
would operate pursuant to "such decisionmaking procedures as 
may be effective even if. on occasion, unanimous agreement has 
not been achieved." Certain areas may be especially fertile 
ground for departures from the consensus model through the 
adoption of more streamlin~d, quasi-legislative processes that 
nonetheless afford ihdividualnation-states guarantees that their 
needs will be met. 
One area that is ripe for a deviation from the consensus 
priQciple is}hat of amendments to existing multilateral agree-
ments. Jn the environmental area, in which the scientific knowl-
edge underlying t~eaty pr~~isions iS ~ften in a consta~t state of 
evolution. the reassessment of international obligations is often 
desirable if not necessary. Under customary international law. 
however, an amendment to a multilateral treaty is binding only 
on those nations that indicate their affirmative intent to accept 
those new obligations, ordinarily throu2:h ratificntinn .-.f •hA 
·~i~l1t"~~~l%fmtf ~tit1it~f'ltth•:::~i~·· ·.•··•'··, ..•.. ,·.smtt'·.~,he·:·'·•.'~o:'t'·'•l·.·1,,s·~,',l~.:··en,·.·.1,' .. p,·.•ri .. ,,,·1c.·,l;t·,·.•.c·:sy~:'··.1.;.t:·,.1·'·m··i•.··'Oo·····,a.,,.:,n•··,.·:·.n,·.,·.'.':•.·l.'·s·.·~~ • ,·.·.,ft ,• ~•'.,'.:l.h.·.·.· ... e.'t ,x.•:·e.l·.d,·.,·.eo''>,·n•'··· .. .s·: .:n·.•,·.• ..•. P.•.:b,.·,.~•.! .. se··•.·,::o.h.,:,t'c•:.·,•·Lc·'····'lo~.,'te,•t·.·e.m:·.'·s.·,·.',:.'s .  .f :··e:.·,c:.e.·.· .. ,'.·•.q·s:b·.'·'·:•,···· .• Au.•,·,·l·,·,: . ,: n, ..• n·,,i. .o,·.1r:'<l.''t;,'..·, .. ·,:'.-1:··'.:.,n:.•rt.~.,'·,_o·,.: •. ·.:·" .p.·.e.•,,·.•,·:·•··o.p•,,,:.sa':nr.•:·Po.·.•,a.·, .. ',' · ,,.a· . e ,.~.:,:c·l:.,.a·p1· .. ···.:,.l·,',:·J·,,::·,··'•.tfn· .• ·. .l,··1'ao··:eb.',:··•·.:,tnd':y1·,'··:.•.·o,·'.':,'·,,•.'·o·.··, . ,'n' ··'.o,·,,,,.' ,.ro•,:·_.,,···:~·•:·'''··~•·:.·a·:··l·:t·.,,·ty,~,:.•_,:· •. •,:t o, .. '',·ee'::a.u:,sn········.,:t·•·•.:,:,(i .. ,,.t·,,·,·.q····,·h .•.. m.:.•:u·,,·,·•,•a·~·•.s·••,'a ... ·:,e •t,·e··.1·:.·.·,·.hh·ri.·,.,f1t.·.·.sa'' •• o,,l,·.·.·•,ev·.·.o.·d·.:.:.,d.,.e ..   .  f.·,·•,··::,·.· •. • •. ;.·.,'.:.:.,, .. ·,;;·.·· 
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gravi .in .the dse,·of complex. 4eli6~t6ly;haJanced, regulatory to l'emove· the ''opi0out" provisions froinJhese triodds/ Indeed; 
regimes like the Montrea1 ProtbcoL <' the "adjustment'' pmcedure for the acloption of 1116difications to 
, : 1Jie:Protoco1 departs,,from, the o'rdinar)",rule, by. specifying · the Morifreal Prot6coJ by•qual i fied,n1ajoritY can be:~oiisid;.fred :[ 
. expressly that''adjustments'·toth~ !gr~ineiit'sreduction sched~ special' case of'hiese precedents. ' · .. ' ' 
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,, ' parties to the Protocol ad~pt'ed ':1n iriterpi~tatio'n worthy ~f tion of a convention then triggers an obligat1on for each nation-
Solomon, in which revisions to the reduction schedules for the state to consider ratification of the agieement. even if everyone 
eight chemicals now covered by the agreement are subject to the of that nution-state's delegates to the Conference Voted against 
non-consensus adjustment process but the addition of new chemi- the instrument. Further progress toward the adoption of non-
cals requires a foll-blown amendment. Nonetheless, the prece- consensus approaches might be assisted by assuring the integrity 
dent of the adoption of binding rules by qualified majority has of the processes by which streamlined decisions must be taken. 
been fim1ly established in the environment sphere. For instance. the role of scientific infonnation and scientific 
Outside the environmental arena. non-consensus amendment uncertainty in the adoption of treaty amendments or technical 
processes are far from unprecedented. The World Bank,s con- requirements might be established. Procedures for challenging 
stituent treaties, for instance. provide for most amendments to and reviewing non-consensus decisions and verifying scientific 
become effective for all members upon approval by three-fifths information- similar to our system ofjudicial review of admin-
of the Bank's members holding four-fifths of the total voting istrative action. although not necessarily relying on courts for 
power. This means that at least in theory amendments to the implementation - might be created for aggrieved nation•states. 
Bank's constitutional .. instrument could be adopted over .the, Alternatively, a nation-state bound bv a decisionwith which that 
objection of the United States; which holds less thantwenty per state disagr;es rriight l:rnve the dghil~·~i';que~t ea~ly reconside!'a~ 
cent of the voting power in ihe compqnent i~sthuticms of the tion i.'lf the acti6n> . , . . , , . , . , , . , 
Bank. Likewise, the constituenfagreemerits of the International 
Monetary fupd(INlfl), the Wo~lcfHealth:Organization, a11dlhe, , 
Worldln telle~tual P~operty Orgiu~ization. h~ve amendinentpro~ 
visions that become dfective for :iii members upon approval hy 
a qualified majority. 
Decisions taken pursuant to an established international -
typically treaty-regime are a second area where non-consensus 
clecisioninaking procedures may be particularly palatable. The 
Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank, for example. 
exercises just such a quasi-legislative authority in approving loan 
proposals by majority vote. The fMF. the regional banks. and the 
newly-created European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRO) have similar majority voting procedures in their 
constitutional instruments. 1 
Majority processes may be especially desirable for highly 
scientific and technical matters that are often associated with 
other policy. legal. and economic issues in the enviromnent,)l 
field. While not purely npn~consensus processes. special stn:an~-
lined provisionsfor technical matters hnve been adopted fdrthe 
establishment of technical. requirements under a number of 
maritime pollution agreements,,most 1wntbly thoseJorthe pro-· 
tection of the Baltic ;ind Mediterranean Seas. These agreements. 
• ,"-r· . ' 
With !he exception of the EBRO. whid1 is still too new. all uf these 
ins!itutions have come in for their share of environmental ce,v,;ure. In pan. 
this critici,m srems from the perco:ived concentration of power in these 
institutions· professional staffs. which in mm arguably derives from major-
ity decision-making processes. Howcwr. environmental con\idcrations tlo 
Ccl~clusicl;{ 
The, urgenc/ for access by the public to international law-
making and law-enforcement mechanisms and the need for 
certain non-consensus decisionmaking: procedures are well i I lus-
trated by. but by no means confined to. the environmental fie.Id. 
Nonetheless. in this. as in other matters. intem,itional environ-
mental law well may he a paradigm that illustrates the potential 
of international law generally well into the next century. The 
recent explosion in the number of international meetings on the 
global environment. culminating: in the 1992 United Nations-
sponsored conference in Brazil. presents numerous opportunities 
for addressing: procedural rights for the public and an,1ly1.ing the 
effectiveness of international deeisi<rnmaking: processes. But the 
intent behind UNCED goes one step further. in that that event is 
self-consciously designed to catalyze change on such pervasive, 
issues of'stnicturc. instituii;)n, andPrinciplc. , 
fVluch of the pr~paratory work ofUNCED has been taken up 
with excessively curnhersomc, if not frighteningly daunling. 
tasks that may haveiittfe bcncficial dTeerinthe real worldi If the 
glt1l1al cnvirnnme'1~tdepemJs on mustering rhe political will to 
lllll ne-l:es...,ariiy ~lHlllSl.'l ahalu.fonrnc-nt of tna.µtrity -.,-,rm~ prn~~~dur~s. In~h..'~id. 
'.'solution..; In the"e prnhle1n:-; ,fft: mnrc hkdy to CPt!lt' front greater ;u:cnuntah1ii,ly 
dir~1.:cly ro !he puhlit'. Lhrou~h rnnn: 1\ix·nnl..'."-'.\ rn ~tt..~t:i,itHl~nrni..ing ant.I tmprovi=td 
opportunities for public partil'ipation. 
aifexfmrfi~\H\'Hy'eh6t'iifot1s·•1ti.ttilbc(·lif'pcrrndfrttron:,;t1fcpt1rties:····•,•··· '••interest,intull·•·.globalcomphancewhile,simultaneously.advanc-. 
Whcih~1:•:Iiiy1nc;111ingful review of, Jctal(>;;e i1licr;1tioi1s •ki,aH ing the. cause ofcnviroiunentai quality. But an international 
these i11'fartin1en1S L;an take place in the next yenris highly forum, while perhaps desirable, is by no means necessary for 
questionable. progress in these areas. It may be appropriate to consider, as a 
Instead. I believe that significant progress can be purchased strictly domestic matter. the unilateral creation by statute of APA-
quite cheaply through reasonably simple, forward-looking changes like requirements for the Executive Branch agencies engaged in 
in the wi1y we do business on the international level. Who could certain international processes. Whether changes are initiated by 
oppHse~lri ct·en fon:ement ofintemat.ional.,env i ronrnental obliga-. national .goyemmrntli i.J,Cling dqmestjc i.J,lly, natjqnal govel1lr1entti 
tions? There is always considerable apprehension on the part of acting in the international arena. or by international organizations 
the United State~ -a country that prides itself on full implemen- themselves, the need for progress in this previously neglected 
tation of its international legal obligations - with respect to area no longer can be ignored. 
